Talks by Evans and Fraser at MCMP (25. and 26. Nov)

[Dardashti, Radin]

Speaker: Peter Evans (University of Queensland)
Date: Wed., Nov 25
Location: Ludwigstraße 31, ground floor, Room E21
Time: 16:15 -⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ 17:45

Title: Quantum causal models, faithfulness and retrocausality

Abstract:
Wood and Spekkens (2015) argue that any causal model explaining the EPRB 
correlations and satisfying no-signalling must also violate the 
assumption that the model faithfully reproduces the statistical 
dependences and independences---a so-called “fine-tuning” of the causal 
parameters; this includes, in particular, retrocausal explanations of 
the EPRB correlations. I consider this analysis with a view to 
enumerating the possible responses an advocate of retrocausal 
explanations might propose. I focus on the response of Näger (2015), who 
argues that the central ideas of causal explanations can be saved if one 
accepts the possibility of a stable fine-tuning of the causal 
parameters. I argue that, in light of this view, a violation of 
faithfulness does not necessarily rule out retrocausal explanations of 
the EPRB correlations.


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Speaker: James Fraser (University of Leeds)
Date: Thu., Nov 26
Location: Ludwigstraße 31, ground floor, Room E21
Time: 12:15 -⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ 13:45

Title: Relativity in Quantum Field Theory

Abstract:
There has recently been heated debate amongst philosophers of physics 
about which formulation of quantum field theory (QFT) ought to be the 
basis of philosophical investigations of high energy physics. Doreen 
Fraser has defended the primacy of axiomatic formulations of QFT, while 
David Wallace advocates the philosophical significance of cutoff QFTs. 
In this paper I focus on one issue underlying this dispute, namely the 
status of relativity in QFT. While Fraser takes QFT to incorporate a 
commitment to Minkowski space-time, Wallace views QFT as an effective 
field theory which says nothing about the fundamental nature of 
space-time, and is unfazed by the fact that imposing a cutoff breaks 
Poincaré covariance. One way out of this apparent stalemate, I suggest, 
is to relax the idea that there is a one preferred 'foundational' 
version of QFT. We can then allow that different formalisms, which 
incorporate different claims about space-time structure, are the 
appropriate objects of study for different philosophical projects. In 
particular, I argue that the question of whether quantum theory can be 
combined with fundamental Minkowski space-time structure and what we 
ought to believe about the world given the successes of the standard 
model are distinct and that it may be that axiomatic and cutoff 
formulations of QFT are the right starting points for each.