Final CFA: Alternative Approaches to Scientific Realism

[Neil Dewar]

Final CFA: Alternative Approaches to Scientific Realism

Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

April 16-17, 2020

We welcome submission of 500 word abstracts from early career researchers on any topic related to the themes of the conference (more information below). 

Topic
There has been a recent move in philosophy of science towards views that in some sense reject the strict dichotomy between realism and anti-realism, or otherwise situate themselves between these two extremes. These include varieties of structuralism, perspectivalism, and pluralism/relativism, and have been applied across various scientific domains, including physics, mathematics, biology, cognitive science, and computer science. It seems plausible that each of these views might share some motivations and have in mind a similar target, i.e. the idea that there is an attitude we could hold towards our scientific theories that is somehow 'less' demanding than full-blown realism, and yet somehow 'more' rigorous than full-blown anti-realism. This conference will bring together representatives of each of these viewpoints, in order to compare the respective progress made by each approach, and to develop a shared foundation for the future development of alternatives to traditional scientific realism and anti-realism.

Confirmed Speakers

James Ladyman, University of Bristol

Michela Massimi, University of Edinburgh

Martin Kusch, University of Vienna

Natalie Alana Ashton, University of Stirling

Ana-Maria Cretu, University of Edinburgh

Fiona Doherty, University of Stirling

James Read, University of Oxford

Call for Abstracts (deadline 15 December 2019)
We welcome submission of 500 word abstracts from early career researchers on any topic related to the themes of the conference. Possible topics include (but are not limited to):

What is the common ground between structuralist, perspectivalist, pluralist, and relativist approaches to scientific theory and practice?
What are the major differences between these approaches?
How might insights from each approach be applied to problems faced by the others?
Should we take a different approach (qua realism) to scientific theorising in distinct fields or domains?
Could one (or more) of these approaches be collapsed into a single shared approach?
Are these approaches all 'stable', or do they risk collapsing into either full-blown realism or anti-realism?
Are these approaches merely provisional, until we reach a 'completed' science, or should we adopt an 'in-principle' structuralist, perspectivalist, or relativist approach towards science?

We will be able to cover all travel and accommodation expenses for accepted speakers from Europe, and to subsidise travel expenses from further afield (enabled by a generous grant from the DFG). Abstracts should be suitably blinded, and submitted to https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=aatsr19 <https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=aatsr19>. The deadline for submissions is December 15, 2019. Questions should be directed to Joe Dewhurst (J.Dewhurst at lmu.de <mailto:J.Dewhurst at lmu.de>).

--
Neil Dewar

Assistant Professor
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
Lehrstuhl für Wissenschaftstheorie
Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
Ludwigstraße 31
80539 München, Deutschland

neildewar.wordpress.com <http://neildewar.wordpress.com/>
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