First CFA: Alternative Approaches to Scientific Realism
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
April 16-17, 2020
Topic
There has been a recent move in philosophy of science towards views that in some sense reject the strict dichotomy between realism and anti-realism, or otherwise situate themselves between these two extremes. These include varieties of structuralism, perspectivalism, and pluralism/relativism, and have been applied across various scientific domains, including physics, mathematics, biology, cognitive science, and computer science. It seems plausible that each of these views might share some motivations and have in mind a similar target, i.e. the idea that there is an attitude we could hold towards our scientific theories that is somehow ‘less’ demanding than full-blown realism, and yet somehow ‘more’ rigorous than full-blown anti-realism. This conference will bring together representatives of each of these viewpoints, in order to compare the respective progress made by each approach, and to develop a shared foundation for the future development of alternatives to traditional scientific realism and anti-realism.
Confirmed Keynote Speakers
James Ladyman, University of Bristol
Michela Massimi, University of Edinburgh
Martin Kusch, University of Vienna
Call for Abstracts (deadline 15 December 2019)
Up to three additional speaking slots are reserved for early career researchers, to be filled on a competitive basis. We welcome submission of 500 word abstracts on any topic related to the themes of the conference. Possible topics include (but are not limited to):
What is the common ground between structuralist, perspectivalist, pluralist, and relativist approaches to scientific theory and practice?
What are the major differences between these approaches?
How might insights from each approach be applied to problems faced by the others?
Should we take a different approach (qua realism) to scientific theorising in distinct fields or domains?
Could one (or more) of these approaches be collapsed into a single shared approach?
Are these approaches all ‘stable’, or do they risk collapsing into either full-blown realism or anti-realism?
Are these approaches merely provisional, until we reach a ‘completed’ science, or should we adopt an ‘in-principle’ structuralist, perspectivalist, or relativist approach towards science?
We hope to be able to cover all travel and accommodation expenses for accepted speakers, conditional on available funding. Abstracts should be suitably blinded, and submitted to https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=aatsr19. The deadline for submissions is December 15, 2019. Questions should be directed to Joe Dewhurst (J.Dewhurst@lmu.de).
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Neil Dewar
Assistant Professor
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
Lehrstuhl für Wissenschaftstheorie
Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
Ludwigstraße 31
80539 München, Deutschland