Talks by Renato Renner (Nov. 17), Michael Stoeltzner (Nov. 19), and Chris Fuchs (Nov. 20) at LMU next week

[Michael Cuffaro]

Speaker: Renato Renner (ETH Zürich)
Date: Monday, 17 November 2014
Location: H030, Fakultät für Physik der LMU, Schellingstr. 4
Time: 17:15 - 19:00

Title: Is the wave function in one-to-one correspondence with reality?

Abstract:
The old question (considered already by Einstein) whether the 
quantum-mechanical wave function represents "reality" has recently 
attracted renewed interest. Amazingly, modern approaches inspired by 
Quantum Information Theory can provide answers. In my talk, I will 
provide an overview on them, focusing on a recent result that 
establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the wave function and 
the “elements of reality”.

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Speaker: Michael Stoeltzner (University of South Carolina/CAS/MCMP)
Date: Wednesday, November 19 2014.
Location: Ludwigstr. 31, ground floor, room 021
Time: 16:15 - 18:00

Title: The Varieties of Explanation in the Higgs Sector

Abstract:
I argue that there is no single universal conception of scientific 
explanation that is consistently employed throughout Higgs physics – 
ranging from the successful search for a standard model (SM) Higgs 
particle and the hitherto unsuccessful searches beyond it, to 
phenomenological model builders in the Higgs sector and theoretical 
physicists interested in the Higgs mechanism. But the coexistence of 
deductive-statistical, unificationist, model-based, and 
statistical-relevance explanations does not amount to a fragmentation of 
the discipline, but allows elementary particle physicists to 
simultaneously pursue a plurality of research strategies and keep the 
field together by joint convictions about the SM and shared explanatory 
ideals. Most importantly, the SM represents both a successful 
explanation and contains aspects in need of further explanation. Such 
explanatory ideals typically appear as stories or narratives motivating 
the different models and linking them to the whole of the discipline.

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Speaker: Chris Fuchs (University of Massachusetts at Boston)
Date: Thursday, November 20, 2014
Location: Ludwigstr. 31, ground floor, room 021
Time: 18:15 - 20:00

Title: QBism, a Subjective Way to Take Ontic Indeterminism Dead Seriously

Abstract:
The term QBism, invented in 2009, initially stood for Quantum 
Bayesianism, a view of quantum theory a few of us had been developing 
since 1993.  Eventually, however, I. J. Good's warning that there are 
46,656 varieties of Bayesianism came to bite us, with some Bayesians 
feeling their good name had been hijacked.  David Mermin suggested that 
the B in QBism should more accurately stand for "Bruno", as in Bruno de 
Finetti, so that we would at least get the variety of (subjective) 
Bayesianism right.  The trouble is QBism incorporates a kind of 
metaphysics that even Bruno de Finetti might have rejected!  So, trying 
to be as true to our story as possible, we momentarily toyed with the 
idea of associating the B with what Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr. called bettabilitarianism.  It is the idea that the world is loose 
at the joints, that indeterminism plays a real role in the world.  In 
the face of such a world, what is an active agent to do but 
/participate/ in the uncertainty that is all around him?  As Louis 
Menand put it, "We cannot know what consequences the universe will 
attach to our choices, but we can bet on them, and we do it every day." 
This is what QBism says quantum theory is about:  How to best place bets 
on the consequences of our actions in this quantum world.  But what an 
ugly, ugly word, "bettabilitarianism"!  Therefore, maybe one should just 
think of the B as standing for no word in particular, but a deep idea 
instead:  That the world is so wired that our actions as active agents 
actually /matter/.  Our actions and their consequences are not 
eliminable epiphenomena.  In this talk, I will describe QBism as it 
presently stands and give some indication of the many things that remain 
to be developed.

NOTE that Chris Fuchs' talk will follow one by Joseph Berkovitz 
(University of Toronto) on "A New Interpretation of De Finetti’s Theory 
of Subjective Probability" from 16:00 - 18:00 (more details at: 
http://www.mcmp.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/events/calendar/index.html)